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The Broad Impact of a Narrow Conﬂict: How Natural
Resource Windfalls Shape Policy and Politics
Jasper Cooper, Columbia University
Sung Eun Kim, Korea University
Johannes Urpelainen, Johns Hopkins UniversityAccess to natural resources creates a political conﬂict between the expected economic winners and their environmental
opponents, but the effects of such conﬂict on policy and politics remain unclear. To examine the scope of such effects,
we exploit the rapid and unanticipated technological breakthroughs in the “fracking” of shale gas. During the past
decade, shale gas production around the Marcellus Shale formation in the Northeastern United States expanded
rapidly. Using a quasi-experimental design, we examine how access to shale gas in electoral districts changed the voting
record of House Representatives on environmental policy relative to neighboring districts without access. Votes become
15–20 percentage points less likely to be in favor of the environment. The best explanation for this effect is the strong
electoral performance of (anti-environmental) Republicans in shale-affected districts. The narrow conﬂict has a broad
impact: access to natural resources puts downward pressure on environmental policy across the board.When a new natural resource is found, distribu-tional conﬂicts between expected winners andlosers surface, and the outcome of these conﬂicts
depends on the relative power of various interests (Grossman
and Helpman 1994; Olson 1965; Stigler 1971). Because the
extraction of natural resources may produce negative exter-
nalities, such as water and air pollution, some social groups
demand stringent regulations to govern resource extraction.
At the same time, political constituencies expecting to beneﬁt
from access to the resource demand policies that maximize
the pace and minimize the cost of its extraction. These dis-
tributional conﬂicts revolve around the regulation of the ex-
traction of the resource itself.
Although the role of natural resource windfalls in creating
distributional conﬂicts is widely acknowledged, their inﬂu-
ence on politics remains unclear. This is because the litera-
ture focuses narrowly on the issue that generates the conﬂict
in the ﬁrst place (e.g., Aldrich 2008; Cheon and Urpelainen
2013; McAdam and Boudet 2012; Rabe 1994, 2014; Stokes
2015). In this article, we provide a theory of how narrowJasper Cooper is a PhD candidate at Columbia University, New York, NY 10027.
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All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms conﬂicts over natural resources can affect a broader range of
regulatory issues through the selection of elected ofﬁcials
with correlated policy preferences. We argue that natural re-
source windfalls might not only shape how elected ofﬁcials
behave but also, through elections, who they are. In a polarized
legislative environment, a narrow conﬂict over a single regu-
latory issue might thus produce knock-on effects for unrelated
regulatory issues. We provide evidence to discriminate be-
tween behavioral and selection mechanisms and show that
when natural resource windfalls systematically beneﬁt polit-
ical parties whose candidates hold anti-environmental pref-
erences, a narrow conﬂict over a speciﬁc natural resource can
bring anti-environmental candidates into power, with down-
ward pressure on environmental policy broadly.
We investigate the effects of natural resource windfalls on
policy and politics by looking at the case of the American
“shale gas revolution” (Deutch 2011). Due to rapid and unex-
pected advances in extraction technology, the production of
natural gas through “fracking” in the United States boomed in
the late 2000s. Recent studies show that the local economicSung Eun Kim (sung_kim@korea.edu) is an assistant professor of politica
en (JohannesU@jhu.edu) is the Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz Professor o
International Studies, Washington, DC 20036.
n the article available in the JOP Dataverse (https://dataverse.harvard.edu
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/694787.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/694787
3816/2018/8002-0018$10.00
8.094.070 on October 01, 2019 12:18:13 PM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).l
f
Volume 80 Number 2 April 2018 / 631effects of the fracking boom have been largely positive (Allcott
and Keniston 2014; Cust and Poelhekke 2015; Fetzer 2014). At
the same time, fracking is a fundamentally political phenom-
enon. Recent studies identify conﬂicts over the regulation of
fracking, with the industry promoting minimal regulation and
local opponents, who often express concern about water pol-
lution, insisting on stringent regulations, or even a blanket ban
(Davis 2012; Mallinson 2014; Rabe 2014; Rabe and Borick
2013). Local debates about fracking are often intense. In
Susquehanna County, Pennsylvania, reports The New York
Times, “shale gas development has divided neighbors, spurred
lawsuits and sown deep mistrust.” At the county seat in Mon-
rose, Florida, a personal-injury law ﬁrm advertises with the
slogan “HURT by DRILLING?” Meanwhile, in De Soto Par-
ish, Louisiana, fracking is for “some residents . . . a gift from
God.”1
By examining the political effects of shale gas, we can in-
vestigate how access to a resource windfall with potential for
environmental destruction shapes voting on policies through
the changed incentives of elected ofﬁcials and preferences of
the local population. In particular, if shale gas production
has political effects, they should be apparent in environ-
mental and energy policy making. Because the key political
cleavages about fracking are related to environmental regula-
tions, such as restrictions on fracking or penalties for ground-
water contamination, any political effects of shale gas access
should be apparent in roll-call voting behavior related to the
narrow set of environmental issues directly related to drilling
and fossil fuels. However, we can also examine the broader
impact of windfalls by examining how they affect decisions on
unrelated environmental issues, such as regulation of oceans,
transport, and wildlife. We seek both to identify the political
effects of the shale gas boom and to investigate the causal
mechanisms that produce these effects. Using records on con-
gressional votes on environmental issues compiled by the
League of Conservation Voters (LCV 2013), our analysis
focuses on the effects of shale gas on environmental roll-call
voting in the House of Representatives.
We identify effects using a regression discontinuity design
premised on the ignorability assumptions of local randomi-
zation: the assignment of an electoral district to the “shale” or
“no-shale” sides of theMarcellus Shale boundary is considered
conditionally independent of potential outcomes (Calonico,
Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014; Lee 2008; Skovron and Titiunik
2015). We bolster the identifying assumptions in four ways.
First, we employ a difference-in-differences estimator that1. “When a Rig Moves Next Door.” New York Times, November 6,
2010.
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All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms compares the difference in environmental voting before and
after the shale revolution between units with andwithout shale
resource endowments, allowing us to account for any time-
invariant differences between units on either side of the border.
Speciﬁcally, we compare votes in the years 2003–4, unam-
biguously before the shale gas boom, and in the years 2010–11,
after shale gas production had begun. This strategy exploits the
rapid and unexpected nature of the shale boom in the areas
surrounding the Marcellus Shale. During this period, there
was also no electoral redistricting around the Marcellus Shale.
Outside Texas, the shale gas boom began so abruptly that we
can plausibly rule out any anticipation of the boom by politi-
cal ofﬁcials, prior to 2005. Second, we inversely weight our
observations by their predicted propensity to fall on either side
of the boundary, as a function of district size, addressing con-
cerns about correlation in assignment propensities and out-
comes. Third, we only consider direct neighbors along the
border in our main speciﬁcations, as these are the most likely
to have equal propensities of falling on either side of the bound-
ary. Finally, we demonstrate balance on the temporal variation
in a host of potentially confounding variables.
Adopting this conservative approach, we ﬁnd a strong and
negative natural resource effect on support for environmen-
tal policy in the House. Our analysis of the voting record of
House Representatives on environmental policy demonstrates
that votes from shale districts become less pro-environment
compared to the period prior to the shale revolution, while
such change is not observed in votes from districts without
shale resources. Relative to the trend over time in the nonshale
districts, shale gas reduces the likelihood of favoring the
environment in any kind of vote by 15–20 percentage points.
The effect is not much larger on voting on issues directly rel-
evant to fracking: the difference is 18 percentage points on votes
that are speciﬁcally about energy and drilling. The coefﬁcient
for issues that are not directly relevant to shale gas remains
negative and indicates a 7 percentage point difference-in-
difference in the likelihood of adopting a pro-environmental
position. These coefﬁcients are not statistically distinguish-
able from one another, suggesting relative homogeneity in
effects across areas of environmental policy.
Why did patterns of voting change? As outcomes are ob-
served at the district level, we distinguish between a change in
the behavior of incumbent legislators (behavioral mechanism)
and change in the electoral fortunes of pro-environmental
and anti-environmental candidates (selection mechanism).
The evidence suggests that access to shale gas favored anti-
environmental policy primarily due to the electoral gains that
Republicans have reaped in districts with access to shale.
Analyzing the outcomes of the 2002, 2004 (pre-shale boom),
and 2010 (post-shale boom) congressional elections, we ﬁnd8.094.070 on October 01, 2019 12:18:13 PM
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points more likely to elect Republicans relative to the time
trend in neighboring districts. We only ﬁnd weak evidence
for a behavioral effect.
Thus, the narrow distributional conﬂict over shale appears
to have had a broad impact on policy through elections. Al-
though access to new natural resources such as fossil fuels
often calls for new regulations, if an electoralmajority stands to
gain from extracting those resources, they may put downward
pressure on environmental regulation by electing legislators
with anti-environmental preferences. One of the core ques-
tions in this ﬁeld concerns the inability of governments to
protect the environment and human society from the nega-
tive externalities from economic activity (e.g., Hardin 1968;
Ostrom 1990). The shale gas boom offers a possible political
economy explanation for this policy failure. Because access to
resources such as fossil fuels strengthens the political position
of anti-environmental forces, a downward spiral in envi-
ronmental regulation is possible. When natural resources be-
come available, the need for regulations to ensure their sus-
tainable use is the greatest, but political forces drive societies
toward deregulation. We argue that political polarization (Lay-
man, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006) broadens the policy effects
of shale gas: pro-shale candidates are more likely to win
elections and also hold a set of correlated anti-environmental
policy preferences that they carry with them into ofﬁce. This
correlation in policy positions held by legislators, a symptom
of a politically polarized society (e.g., Converse 1964), im-
plies that narrow conﬂicts can affect a much broader range
of issues if they also impact elections. The combination of
electoral selection and partisan polarization at the elite level
allows the natural resource windfall to put downward pres-
sure on environmental policy across the board, instead of
only generating the domain-speciﬁc conﬂicts found in other
studies (Aldrich 2008; McAdam and Boudet 2012; Rabe
1994, 2014; Rabe and Borick 2013).
Our study joins a small but growing body of literature on
the political and policy effects of natural resource windfalls
beyond the resource curse (e.g., Ross 1999). Stokes (2015)
analyzes the divisive politics of wind power in Canadian elec-
tions. Adding to a body of literature on retrospective voting,
she shows that the local opponents of wind power contrib-
uted to an electoral backlash against the incumbent gov-
ernment. Similar to her study, we provide causal estimates
for the political impact of a natural resource discovery. How-
ever, we examine both the policy and electoral consequences
of the winner-loser conﬂict and focus on a different political
issue, shale gas. In our electoral analysis, instead of focusing
on incumbency, we emphasize ideological differences be-
tween America’s twomajor political parties. We ﬁnd that theThis content downloaded from 169.22
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms shale gas windfall beneﬁts anti-environmental candidates,
while the local losers appear to have little inﬂuence over elec-
toral outcomes. The implications of our results are broader
than those of a conventional “not in my backyard” electoral
backlash: the partisan bias of electoral winners means that
the impact is felt across a wider range of policy areas than
those directly concerning fossil fuels.
In a working paper, Fedaseyeu, Gilje, and Strahan (2015)
investigate the association between shale gas production and
Republican electoral success. They compare the electoral
fortunes of Democrats and Republicans across American
states before and after 2003 (when commercial shale gas
production began in Texas) and ﬁnd Republican challengers
gaining at the expense of Democrat incumbents. Their
study is the closest to ours in the literature, but our approach
differs in two critical respects. First, substantively, we use
detailed data on individual votes on environmental policy,
as opposed to general summaries at the legislator level. Our
primary focus is on how shale gas changes environmental
roll-call votes, while Fedaseyeu et al. (2015) restrict their
attention to electoral politics. We are not only interested in
electoral outcomes but also on whether, why, and how they
shape substantive policy formulation in the Congress. In
other words, we detail the policy effects of natural resource
windfalls in a polarized society. Second, methodologically,
their design does not admit any causal claims about the ef-
fects of shale gas. Their ﬁndings are based on the correlation
between shale gas production and the electoral success of
Republicans. Since gas production is endogenous to regu-
latory decisions, it is unsurprising that we should observe
such a correlation (Rabe and Borick 2013). We deal with this
issue in a local regression discontinuity design that focuses
on shale gas deposits, as opposed to production, and weight
observations to deal with nonequal probability of having
shale deposits. Unlike Fedaseyeu et al. (2015), we also deal
with gerrymandering by only focusing on outcomes during
the 2003–11 period.
SHALE GAS IN THE UNITED STATES
Because our identiﬁcation strategy depends on the assump-
tion that shale gas is exogenous to roll-call votes and political
outcomes around the Marcellus Shale, we ﬁrst describe shale
gas extraction in the United States. While the industry has
been aware of unconventional resources for decades, their
widespread exploitation began only toward the year 2010.
Thanks to rapid technological advances in hydraulic frac-
turing, the production of US shale gas has grown exponen-
tially over the past decade. This growth has surprised energy
analysts, as it stems from a combination of unforeseen tech-
nological advances and unusually high natural gas prices.8.094.070 on October 01, 2019 12:18:13 PM
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on unconventional natural gas resources during the 1970s
energy crises (Wang and Krupnick 2013, 7), commercial ex-
traction only began three decades later.
Areas with shale gas formations underneath them are called
basins, and they become plays if the gas can be extracted
using current technologies. Therefore, shale plays are areas
where the fracking industry can operate on a large scale. In
hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”), drilling companies inject a
mix of water and chemicals into wells to fracture the shale
formation. In combination with advanced extraction technol-
ogies, such as horizontal drilling, fracking allows production
of gas from reservoirs that were previously too costly to per-
meate. This technology is key to extracting shale gas from the
Marcellus on a commercial basis.
The shale gas boom began amid the declining production
of conventional natural gas. As Wang and Krupnick (2013,
2) note, the production of conventional gas had peaked al-
ready in the year 1994 and overall production remained ap-
proximately stable until the year 2007 only because of the
modest expansion of coal bed methane and tight gas pro-
duction. By 2013, however, 39% of all US natural gas pro-
duction was from shale.2 Total natural gas production
reached the all time record of 25,700 billion cubic feet, or
30% above the earlier peak in 1994.3
The origins of shale gas production are found in the Barnett
Shale in Texas. An energy company, Mitchell Energy, devel-
oped the technology required for commercial fracking and
started development in the Barnett play already in 1982, but
technological progress was slow and, before the year 2000,
Mitchell never completed more than 70 wells a year. Gradual
advances in drilling technology did improve the proﬁtability
of fracking, but attempts at horizontal drilling—the critical
technology for today’s shale gas operations—failed. Only in
January 2002 did the independent oil and gas operator Devon
Energy buy Mitchell and bring its own expertise, achieving
success in horizontal drilling. Until 2007, however, production
levels outside Texas remained low.4 In the year 2007, Texas still
produced 76% of all shale gas, while Pennsylvania produced
only about 0.01%. In 2013, however, the share of Texas was
only 34% and Pennsylvania was producing 27%.
Another key reason for the spread of exploration activity
was the rapid increase in natural gas prices, driven by the2. See http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?idp907&tp8 (accessed
April 6, 2015).
3. See ﬁg. A1 in the appendix, based on http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng
/hist/n9050us2a.htm (accessed April 6, 2015).
4. See http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_shalegas_s1_a.htm (ac-
cessed April 6, 2015).
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2002, the well-head price had collapsed to USD 3 per million
cubic feet, but the same unit price remained above USD 5 for
most of the critical 2003–8 period (Wang and Krupnick 2013,
28). However, energy companies only realized the abun-
dance of shale gas in the Marcellus Basin in 2008. Shale gas
became heavily publicized when a January 2008 press re-
lease on the work of Terry Engelder, a geoscientist at Penn-
sylvania State University, suggested that studies had dra-
matically underestimated the Marcellus Shale reserve.5 The
report made energy companies aware of a potentially huge
windfall.
SHALE GAS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY,
AND ELECTORAL POLITICS
We consider the effects of a natural resource windfall on
the incentives, behavior, and election of government of-
ﬁcials. While the existing literature has not speciﬁcally the-
orized about the winner-loser politics that natural resource
windfalls generate, we can develop testable hypotheses by
drawing on related bodies of literature. On the one hand,
shale gas might create demand for environmental regu-
lations to deal with the negative externalities from fracking.
On the other hand, a political economy analysis suggests that
shale gas is more likely to put downward pressure on envi-
ronmental regulations, as the unexpected resource windfall
increases the political and economic clout of the energy in-
dustry, thus reducing the competitiveness of pro-regulation
political candidates. We develop both lines of reasoning into
testable hypotheses and then allow our identiﬁcation strat-
egy to adjudicate their explanatory power.
Both the beneﬁts and costs of shale gas extraction apply to
large segments of the population. While some of the rents go
to the fossil fuel industry, some also go to landowners who
sell access to extractors and to the public through royalties
and taxes. Similarly, negative effects such as water pollution
and landscape degradation apply to people living in the area
in general. Given these considerations, the effects of the
shale gas boom should not be conceptualized as a conﬂict
between special interests and the mass public. Instead, shale
gas discoveries create conﬂicts among the population. While
most people want both a cleaner environment and more
economic growth (e.g., Ansolabehere and Konisky 2014), a
shale gas windfall forces them to make difﬁcult choices. The
total political effect of the windfall thus depends on the net
effect: does the advocacy coalition for stringent regulation grow
relatively stronger or do the proponents of low-regulation gain5. See goo.gl/hKPJgK (accessed April 19, 2015).
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of these conﬂicting demands and link them to electoral poli-
tics.
Shale gas and increased demand
for environmental policy
Theories of social mobilization against local negative ex-
ternalities (e.g., Aldrich 2008; Rabe 1994; Stokes 2015) pre-
dict that the increased abundance of natural resources cre-
ates demand for environmental regulation. Besides concerns
about land use and habitat fragmentation, the issue of water
pollution has become a central concern. A recent review of
fracking and water cautions that “there is a need for com-
prehensive risk assessment and regulatory oversight for
spills and other accidental discharges of wastewater to the
environment” (Vidic et al. 2013). While the net effects of
shale gas on the local environment are uncertain, such con-
cerns are frequently raised by opponents of shale gas (Mal-
linson 2014; Rabe 2014; Rabe and Borick 2013). At the same
time, many energy analysts also see positive environmental
effects of shale gas. Because natural gas tends to displace
coal in electricity generation, it allows considerable reduc-
tions in carbon dioxide emissions from the power sector
(Newell and Raimi 2014) and air pollution (Venkatesh et al.
2012), though these beneﬁts are not localized. On the other
hand, some scientists have expressed concern about fugitive
emissions of methane, a powerful greenhouse gas, from shale
extraction and transmission (Howarth, Santoro, and Ingraffea
2011).
Concerns about the local environmental effects of frack-
ing, such as water pollution and damage to the landscape,
increase the salience of environmental issues among pro-
environmental voters and political elites. Fracking thus pro-
vides politicians with an opportunity to attract the votes of
pro-environmental voters. Conversely, elected ofﬁcials risk
losing the support of this coalition, which includes both en-
vironmentalists and ordinary citizens concerned about the
environmental damage caused by fracking, if they fail to reg-
ulate fracking. When concerns about fracking are publicized
in the media and disseminated by environmentalists, the pub-
lic’s concern grows, and people demand a response from
elected ofﬁcials. Failure to act prompts some current support-
ers of the government to either not vote at all or even support
the opposition. Indeed, there is some anecdotal evidence for
a strong demand among the public for more stringent envi-
ronmental regulations. In the United States, local campaigns
against fracking are by now widespread. Food and Water
Watch, an environmental organization campaigning against
fracking, reports that, as of August 26, 2015, 487 munici-
palities in the United States had passed measures to stopThis content downloaded from 169.22
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms fracking.6 The states of New York and Vermont have also
passed bans on fracking.
Shale gas and downward pressure
on environmental policy
A political economy analysis suggests that shale gas creates
demands for relaxing regulations, as economic interests
prevail (e.g., Fedaseyeu et al. 2015; Rabe and Borick 2013).
When an exogenous technological shock enables access to
shale gas, the local population ﬁnds itself sitting on a re-
source windfall. If fracking is permitted, local values of
property on top of shale gas resources surge, and those ex-
pecting to beneﬁt thus become a winners’ interest group.
Municipalities may expect royalties and tax revenue from
the economic boom that follows shale gas extraction. Allcott
and Keniston (2014) show that American fossil fuel booms
have historically had large positive effects on local economic
growth and employment. In particular, “oil and gas booms
substantially increase local economic growth, although the
employment gains are reversed just as quickly during a bust”
(Allcott and Keniston 2014, 4). Hardy and Kelsey (2015) ex-
amine income tax returns of Pennsylvania residents and ﬁnd
that counties with shale gas production see increases both in
employment and royalty returns, with the latter dominating
the income effects. While Muehlenbachs, Spiller, and Tim-
mins (2014) ﬁnd negative effects of shale gas extraction on
property values dependent on groundwater, overall they ﬁnd
positive effects already in the short run. Hausman and Kellogg
(2015) estimate large positive effects for American consumers
of natural gas, and a shift of surplus from conventional gas
producers, who suffer from lower wellhead prices, to new pro-
ducers. Fetzer (2014) reports an 8% increase in personal in-
comes in counties with at least one unconventional oil or gas
well and estimates an overall positive job creation effect of
between 500,000 and 600,000. He also ﬁnds no evidence for
a Dutch disease, as low energy prices beneﬁt local industries.
The support for fracking is ampliﬁed by the activities
of the industry (Mallinson 2014). Where shale gas is avail-
able, the industry has an incentive to support the anti-
environmental camp and strengthen the pro-fracking sen-
timents of the population. If the industry can convince the
public that fracking brings large economic beneﬁts at min-
imal environmental cost, then the industry’s ability to pur-
chase land and gain access to the shale resource increases.
A side effect of such convincing is that the public will be
more favorable toward pro-fracking candidates in elections
as well, be they local, state, or federal. In Pennsylvania, for8.094.070 on October 01, 2019 12:18:13 PM
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promoting fracking, began a series of television and radio
advertisements in September 2014 to convince the local public
that fracking is good for the economy and society.7
Elections as a causal mechanism:
Behavior or selection?
Under democratic political competition, the electoral mecha-
nism is the primary channel through which constituency de-
mand inﬂuences the behavior of politicians (Stokes 2015).
Elected ofﬁcials might respond to the availability of fracking
when in ofﬁce by changing their support for pro- or anti-
fracking policies, but the windfall may also cause a shift in
voting that means different legislators enter ofﬁce. By exam-
ining how the shale gas boom inﬂuences electoral outcomes,
we can distinguish between a “behavioral” causal mechanism
(ofﬁcials change their voting behavior) and a “selection” causal
mechanism (ofﬁcials with different preferences win elections).
Distinguishing between behavioral and selection causal
pathways is essential for grasping the full implications of
natural resource windfalls. If the behavioral mechanism
dominates, then elected ofﬁcials adjust their behavior to re-
spond to the demands of the public. In principle this will
affect a narrower range of issues. But if the selection mech-
anism instead drives the results, then the change in partisan
competition should, in a polarized society, change policy more
broadly.
If there is a selection effect through elections, the direction
of the shift depends on the population’s preferences. If envi-
ronmental concerns dominate, then the expected electoral ef-
fect should favor pro-environmental candidates. If, all things
considered, the public reacts to access to shale gas by increas-
ing demand for environmental protection against the putative
negative effects of fracking, then pro-environmental candi-
dates should see their electoral fortunes improve. On the other
hand, if economic concerns dominate, then the expected elec-
toral effect should favor anti-environmental candidates.
Using various data sources, Dunlap, Xiao, and McCright
(2001) and McCright, Xiao, and Dunlap (2014) show that
both Democrat elites and voters have historically been much
more favorable to environmental causes than their Repub-
lican counterparts, and the difference has grown over time.
Using the same LCV data that we use here, McCright et al.
(2014, 252) ﬁnd that, by 2013, the average “environmental
voting” score of a Democrat House Representative was close
to 90%, while the same score for Republican House Repre-7. See “Shale Gas Industry’s Ad Campaign to Promote Fracking,” Trib
Total Media at http://triblive.com/business/headlines/6853292-74/industry
-shale-pavone (accessed August 26, 2015).
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All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms sentatives had fallen below 10%. In other words, Democrats
vote in favor of the environment in signiﬁcant roll-call votes
nine times out of ten, while Republicans do so fewer than one
in ten cases. For all practical purposes, the pro-environmental
candidate would be a Democrat.
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY: RESEARCH DESIGN
We seek to identify the effect of shale gas resources on en-
vironmental votes in the House of Representatives. We ex-
amine how the American shale boom changed environmental
role call votes by comparing the temporal trend among dis-
tricts with shale gas resources to the trend among districts
without such resources. Formally, our study seeks to identify
the following causal estimand:
tshale p E½(Y shale;post; j 2 Y shale;pre; j)2 (Yno‐shale;post; j
2 Yno‐shale;pre; j) ∣Xj∈W;
where Yshale, post, j and Yshale, pre, j are the jth district’s potential
outcome following and preceding the shale revolution if it
receives a shale endowment, Yno-shale, post, j and Yno-shale, pre, j are its
potential outcomes following and preceding the shale revo-
lution if it does not receive an endowment, Xj indicates the
number of neighboring districts separating district j from
the shale border, and W p ½2w; w indicates the window
around the border of the shale. For example, a district that is
just on the no-shale side of the border is in position21, and
a district just on the shale side of the border is in position 1.
Their next neighbors away from the border are in positions
22 and 2, respectively.
Employing a “local randomization” regression disconti-
nuity (RD) design (Calonico et al. 2014; Lee 2008; Skovron
and Titiunik 2015), we assume that there is a window on ei-
ther side of the border of the shale deposit, within which it is
as though districts were randomly assigned to either side of
the border. In our main analyses we consider units falling into
the window speciﬁed by wp 1, that is, direct neighbors
along the border of the shale. As the border of the shale is
noncontiguous with district boundaries, we deﬁne whether
districts are on the “shale” or “no shale” side of the border as a
function of howmuch the play and the district overlap. In our
main speciﬁcations, we classify districts with 20% or more
overlap with the shale as receiving an endowment, and then
show that our analyses are robust to respeciﬁcations (ﬁg. A9;
ﬁgs. A1–A10 available in the online appendix).We focus only
on electoral districts around the Marcellus Shale, because
shale gas extraction began much earlier in the other major
shale play, Barnett, Texas, and cannot be considered exoge-
nous for the purposes of identiﬁcation.8.094.070 on October 01, 2019 12:18:13 PM
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“nay,” or absent) in the Congress. The votes are grouped
under district-years. In total, our sample has 55 congres-
sional districts in 14 states. Table A5 (tables A1–A21 avail-
able in the online appendix) shows the number of treated
and control units included in the analysis by state. We assign
a district-year to each vote by determining the timing of
the vote and electoral district of the House Representative.
District-years are then classiﬁed as “shale” or “no-shale.”
We use the years 2003–4 as a pre-boom baseline for the
votes and code votes that took place in the years 2010–11 as
post-boom. We start in 2003 because electoral districts
around Marcellus remain stable between the years 2003–11.
Before the 108th Congress, a major redistricting following
the 2000 US census changed the constellation of electoral
districts, and we therefore cannot analyze the same units
retrospectively into the pre-2003 era. We also exclude the
years 2005–9 because we cannot unambiguously attribute
these years to the pre- or post-boom period. By 2010, the
shale gas boom had already become a real, politically im-
portant phenomenon across districts with shale gas deposits.
Production was booming, prices were high, and intense ex-
ploration activity promised even more production in the
future. Thus, by 2010 shale gas was a political reality that
elected ofﬁcials or the media could not avoid (see below for
evidence of media attention to shale gas by 2010). By clearly
distinguishing between pre-boom and post-boom observa-
tions, we guard against temporal measurement error in the
explanatory variable. The downside of such a short time pe-
riod is that environmental problems that appear with delay
may have been discounted by the local population and their
elected ofﬁcials. In interpreting our results, this limitation
should be kept in mind. We do not, however, use the year
2012 because the results of the extensive redistricting based
on the 2010 census were made public well in advance of the
2012 elections. Thus, it is possible that elected ofﬁcials changed
their behavior in 2012 in response to new district boundaries.
With i denoting environmental votes, j districts, k states,
and t years, our main speciﬁcation is
&
Pro‐Environmentijkt p b1Shaleijk 1 b2Post‐boomt
1 b3Shale# Post‐boomjkt 1 mjk 1 z jt 1 εijkt;
ð1Þ
where Pro-Environmentijk is a binary variable coded 1 if a
legislator from district j was pro-environment in vote i, Shalejk
is a binary variable coded 1 if the district j falls on the shale
side of the border, Post-boomt is coded 1 if the year is 2010 or
2011, and Shale# Post-boomijkt is the interaction of these two
variables. The identiﬁcation strategy focuses on estimating the
coefﬁcient b3. In some speciﬁcations, we include district ﬁxedThis content downloaded from 169.22
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms effects m and state-speciﬁc time trends z. To account for the
clustered nature of the shale assignment and possible inter-
dependencies within electoral units, we cluster standard errors
by electoral district throughout. We use linear probability
models because alternatives suffer from the incidental param-
eters problem with ﬁxed effects.Dependent variable
Our data set indicates whether the Representative voted for
or against the environment in the roll-call vote under anal-
ysis. Drawing on an annual survey of all signiﬁcant energy
and environmental votes in the House and Senate, the LCV
relies on the judgment of an expert panel with 20members to
determine whether “yay” or “nay” is favorable to the envi-
ronment. We exclude Senate votes because they are held at
the state level, resulting in little variation in the explanatory
variable. The pro-environmental position is coded as 1 and
abstention or anti-environmental positions as 0.
Consider the 2013 scorecard (LCV 2013). In this score-
card, a pro-environment House Representative would vote
against an amendment to H.R. 152, the Disaster Relief Ap-
propriations Act of 2013, introduced by John Fleming (R-
LA) because the amendment singled out a wildlife refuge as
ineligible for federal restoration funding due to damages
caused by Hurricane Sandy. A more politically salient ex-
ample would be Lee Terry’s (R-NE) H.R. 3, the Northern
Route Approval Act, which “would remove the requirement
for a Presidential Permit to build the risky Keystone XL tar
sands pipeline, eliminating the Obama Administration’s
ability to complete adequate safety and environmental im-
pact studies on the project” (LCV 2013, 20). Again, a pro-
environment House Representative would vote “no.” For a
list of example bills, see table A3.
The LCV measure has three major advantages. First, the
LCV is careful to consider the signiﬁcance of the bills in-
cluded, avoiding the problem of trivial legislation. Second,
the LCV uses a standard methodology over the years, al-
lowing us to exploit variation over time. Finally, relying on
the LCV’s coding means that our own subjective biases can-
not inﬂuence the construction of the dependent variable. The
primary downsides are that we do have to rely on the LCV’s
perceptions, which could be biased by the organization’s stra-
tegic imperatives, and challenges of comparing roll-call votes
over time, as the legislative agenda of the Congress evolves.
As long as these biases and temporal ﬂuctuations are not
correlated with shale gas resources, however, these downsides
will not compromise our identiﬁcation strategy and hence
generate biased estimates. We also include bill ﬁxed effects in
some models as a robustness check (table A9).8.094.070 on October 01, 2019 12:18:13 PM
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clusive tags to each vote, indicating their relevance to broad
issue areas, such as clean energy and transportation. As ex-
plained below, we use these tags to compare the effect of
shale gas discovery on congressional voting on issues that are
directly related to fossil fuels to unrelated issues. Unfortu-
nately, we cannot analyze climate change votes because there
are no relevant votes during the 2003–4 pre-boom period.
See table A4 for the number of environmental votes by issue
area and period.
Explanatory variable
Our explanatory variable is the presence of exploitable shale
resources—a shale play—in the congressional district. A shale
play is commonly deﬁned as “a set of discovered, undiscovered
or possible natural gas accumulations that exhibit similar
geological characteristics.”8 As we demonstrate in more detail
below, the deﬁnition of a shale play is ideally suited for an
identiﬁcation strategy based on the exogenous distribution of
shale gas with respect to district boundaries, because it does
not require the onset of extraction activity or consider possible
regulatory issues. Data on the geographical distribution of
shale plays comes from shapeﬁles produced onMay 7, 2011, by
the US Energy Information Administration.9
Congressional districts are assigned to have a shale en-
dowment by falling on the “shale” or “no-shale” side of the
border around the shale play. Operating under the assump-
tion that neighboring districts on either side of this border
came the closest to falling on the other side of it, we set our
bandwidth as narrowly as possible, including only ﬁrst neigh-
bors on either side of the border (see table A8 for second and
third neighbors).
Geographic discontinuity designs frequently exhibit an
issue that has been described by Keele and Titiunik (2015) as
the “compound treatment problem.” It arises when multiple
“treatments” simultaneously affect the outcome of interest.
In our study, because the unit of assignment is the electoral
district, the potential bill-voting and electoral outcomes might
be affected both by “irrelevant” district-speciﬁc treatments (lo-
cal electoral dynamics, administrative differences, etc.) and by
shale. Note, however, that this is simply a case of clustered as-
signment, with the 55 electoral districts we consider in our
main speciﬁcations as clusters. To the extent that our assump-
tions about ignorability hold true, the compound treatment8. See http://energy.gov/sites/prod/ﬁles/2013/04/f0/shale_gas_glossary.pdf
(accessed January 26, 2016).
9. See https://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications
/maps/maps.htm (accessed December 5, 2014).
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terpretability or identiﬁcation.
Some districts have only very small amounts of shale
overlapping their borders (ﬁg. A5 shows the histogram of
proportion of district areas covered by shale play and basin).
To sort districts with 5% or 15% overlap, for example, onto
either side of the border, we deﬁne a district as being on the
shale side of the border when at least one-ﬁfth (20%) of the
district has exploitable reserves lying underneath it. In prac-
tice, so few districts are resorted by this decision that our
estimates are robust to any sorting rule between 10% and
25%.
The Appalachian basin and the surrounding districts are
shown in ﬁgure 1. The districts colored dark gray (with and
without dots) constitute the main sample that is considered
in the analysis: these are the units that just received or just
did not receive an endowment in shale resources, and thus
we assume that they constitute the best comparison in terms
of being alike in their potential outcomes.
Since some districts are bigger than others and shale forms
a large, singular polygon, bigger units have a lower propensity
to fully cover the shale than smaller units. If these differences
in probability are correlated with the potential outcomes—
say, if larger districts are also more anti-environmental—un-
weighted estimators will produce biased estimates. We thus
use a binary explanatory variable and weight observations by
the inverse of their predicted propensity to obtain unbiased
estimates (Angrist and Pischke 2009, 84; Gerber and Green
2012, 76, 270–71).10
Identifying assumption: Exogeneity of shale gas
An important feature of our assignment mechanism is the
exogeneity of district borders to that of the shale play. Gerry-
mandering is a well-known part of American politics. One
concern with our strategy might be that the shape of district
borders formed endogenously to concerns about resources in
the pre- or post-boom era. By limiting our analysis to con-
gressional districts in the direct vicinity of the Appalachian
Basin, and deﬁning the “pre-boom” period as 2003–4, we are
able tominimize this concern greatly. Therewas no substantial
redistricting in the districts in our sample between 2003 and
2011.11 Most importantly, we exclude the Texas shale basins
and plays, notably Barnett, as they were already experiencing10. We predict each unit’s propensity to fall either side of the thresh-
old that receives the shale endowment using a probit regression of the
endowment on district surface area. Units that had the highest likelihood of
receiving a substantial endowment (such as small districts) contribute the
least information to the likelihood.
11. See sec. A2.1 for technical details.
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period.
We scrutinized the pre-boom exogeneity assumption in
three ways. First, we read through journalistic accounts of
the shale gas boom, such as McGraw (2011), and found no
evidence of widespread interest in shale gas outside Texas by
the end of 2004. Speciﬁcally, we searched for documented
cases of shale gas exploration outside Texas at different times,
recording the earliest instances. In Pennsylvania, for ex-
ample, McGraw (2011) identiﬁes the ﬁrst limited inquiries
by natural gas companies toward the end of the year 2005.
As noted above, the Pennsylvania shale boom only began in
earnest in 2008 after the Engelder report was published. Sec-
ond, we conducted a media search for newspaper articles with
the word “shale” in the heading. The search shows that there
was little interest in shale in mainstream media until the year
2009 (ﬁg. A6). The few articles that began to appear in 2008
weremostly found inWestern regional newspapers, and it wasThis content downloaded from 169.22
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms only in 2010 that shale gas became a hot topic in the media.
Finally, we investigated data on shale gas exploration wells
(“spuds”) in Pennsylvania, the center of the shale gas boom
around Marcellus. While only six wells were drilled in Penn-
sylvania in 2005, the number reached 1,221 by 2010 and
peaked at 1,816 in 2011.12 Exploration activity in the pre-boom
period wasminimal even in themost active state in the sample,
alleviating concerns about anticipatory effects.
In New York, a de facto moratorium at the state level,
along with many formal bans in counties, prevented fracking
in the period under consideration. We include New York in
our analysis because the new fracking moratorium is en-
dogenous to state politics. Because some speciﬁcations in-
clude state-speciﬁc temporal trends in environmental vot-Figure 1. Units included in the main analysis. We only include shale districts that can be paired with a neighboring no-shale district. For this reason, many of
the districts in the interior of the interior of the Marcellus are excluded. Further, in models with state-speciﬁc time trends, only variation within states is
exploited in the estimation.8.094.070 on October 01, 2019 12:18:13 PM
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in our estimations. When we do exclude New York from the
analysis, the estimated effects of shale gas are at least as large
and in some speciﬁcations larger (table A10).
Bolstering ignorability with differences-
in-differences
The ignorability assumption states that, in expectation, the
“no-shale” and “shale” potential outcomes of the districts in
the study should be equal among those who actually did and
did not end up on the shale side of the border. Because we
have data on pre-boom and post-boom voting records, we
can include district ﬁxed effects in our models and examine
how the shale boom changed outcomes relative to the tem-
poral trend in the group of nonshale districts. With year
ﬁxed effects included, our design also ensures that any sec-
ular trends, such as the rise of the Tea Party and the overall
electoral success of Republicans in the 2010 elections, cannot
bias our estimates. While this context is worth noting, the
trends themselves are considered in the estimation.
This differences-in-differences approach allows us to bol-
ster the ignorability assumption. This is of particular concern
as there is some overlap between coal ﬁelds and shale de-
posits, most notably in West Virginia. The ﬁxed effects take
account of any features of the districts in our sample that do
not vary over time, such as a generally positive or negative
disposition toward fossil energy exploitation. We note further
that coal exploitation neither grew or declined throughout the
study period, as production in major coal states in our sample
(Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia) remained stable
(Foster and Glustrom 2013, 7), and that the districts in our
sample on both sides of the border contain a mix of coal and
noncoal areas. Our tests of parallel trends further show no pre-
shale differences in demographic, social, or economic trends.13
To investigate whether the pre-boom voting trends were
similar between districts with and without shale deposits, we
visualize voting trends over time and formally test this as-
sumption with regression analysis. Figure A4 shows the trend
of roll-call votes on the environment in districts with and
without shale from 2003 to 2011. Consistent with the quasi-
random assignment of shale deposits, in 2003 and 2004 there
was no difference in environmental roll-call votes across shale
and nonshale districts. Note that our empirical analysis fo-
cuses on the years 2003 and 2004 as pre-boom period (when13. Another possible concern is a spatial correlation between shale
gas and conventional oil/gas deposits. Around Marcellus Shale, however,
conventional oil/gas production has remained at low levels for decades
(see EIA historical data at https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn
_adc_mbblpd_a.htm, accessed September 27, 2016).
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shale gas at all) and the years 2010 and 2012 as post-boom
period. For the average pro-environment votes, we ﬁrst cal-
culated the yearly average of pro-environment votes in each
district in our sample and then averaged it across all districts
of the sample. The top-left panel of the ﬁgure illustrates the
trend in pro-environment voting in all environmental roll-
call votes from 2003 to 2011. This exercise suggests that shale
and no-shale units moved in the same direction and to the
same degree in their trends in the pre-boomperiod. The other
panels looking at the trends of pro-environment voting by a
given issue area also show no visible difference between shale
and no-shale units with respect to the outcome. Section A2.3
(in the online appendix) shows no evidence against pre-boom
parallel trends.
Some speciﬁcations include pro-environmental voting
trends by state. Because state policies on shale vary, it is useful
to allow each state to follow a different temporal trend. Such
time trends also allow us to account for state-speciﬁc changes
in the legislative agenda. They also ensure that our results can-
not be driven by differences between nonshale and shale dis-
tricts across states: when state-speciﬁc time trends are included,
only variation in shale deposits within each state is used in the
estimation. This test is important because some of the nonshale
districts have no shale counterpart in their state. Between 2003–
4 and 2010–11, the legislative agenda of the Congress changed
considerably, and our modeling strategy allows votes from dif-
ferent states to react to these changes in the agenda differently.
Finally, we also conduct a balance test focusing on tem-
poral variation in the pre-shale period (pre-2005). Because
the ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation takes care of any time-invariant
imbalances in the sample, the main concern regarding bal-
ance is that some time-varying imbalance could be driving
results. Using variables matched between the 2000 census
and the 2005 American Community Survey (ACS) data, and
aggregated to the electoral district level, we were able to assess
balance on temporal trends in the units in our main speciﬁ-
cations. Speciﬁcally, we looked at variables likely to drive
changes in voting behavior, such as population growth (total
population), social structure (proportion of family households),
gender composition (male to female ratio), education and skills
(proportion of uneducated males), income trends (median
household and per capita), housing trends (proportion of houses
greater than USD 80,000 in value), employment (proportion
employed in manufacturing) and race (proportion of white).
Table A6 presents the results of the balance analysis.
No differences in trends are statistically signiﬁcant, even
without multiple comparisons adjustments to p-values. Sub-
stantively, the differences are very small (around 1%–2% in
absolute value), with the exception of the percent change in8.094.070 on October 01, 2019 12:18:13 PM
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in tables A12 and A13 that this imbalance does not drive our
results.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS: SHALE GAS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL VOTING IN THE CONGRESS
We ﬁrst present the main analyses of the effect of shale gas
on environmental roll-call votes in the House. The results are
presented in table 1. We include binary indicators for shale
districts and for the period following the shale boom, as well
as their interaction term throughout. The key coefﬁcient is
the interaction term, as it compares changes over time be-
tween districts with and without shale deposits. Provided our
assumptions are met, this coefﬁcient identiﬁes the effect of
the shale boom on environmental roll-call votes.
The indicator for shale districts itself does not show any
consistent pattern across the estimated models.14 This result
suggests that roll-call votes in districts endowed with shale
resources did not show any distinctive pattern prior to the
shale boom: in this respect, the districts appear comparable
prior to the beginning of shale gas exploration and produc-
tion. In contrast, access to shale gas appears to put downward
pressure on pro-environmental voting after the shale boom.
The interaction term, Shale# Post-boom, the key variable of
interest, is negative across all ﬁve estimated models. The mag-
nitude of the point estimate ranges from 20.15 to 20.20 and
the effects remain substantial and robust to the inclusion of
district ﬁxed effects (model 2), state-speciﬁc trends (model 3),
and to the partisanship of legislator in the pre-boom period
(Rep. in 2004, models 4 and 5). Substantively, access to shale gas
seems to reduce the probability of pro-environmental voting
relative to the trend in nonshale districts by 15–20 percentage
points.
Predicted probabilities from a simple logistic regression
without any ﬁxed effects in tables A14 and A15 conﬁrm the
results. The predicted probability of voting for pro-environ-
ment is 43% on average in the shale districts in the pre-boom
period and 33% in the post-boom period, a 10-percentage
point decrease. In nonshale districts, the predicted probability
goes to the opposite direction, increasing from 38% to 43%.
These changes are consistent with the results from the linear
probability models with ﬁxed effects.14. Whenever district ﬁxed effects are included, we omit the constant
and the shale coefﬁcient because they are subsumed by the ﬁxed effects. See
sec. A6 for robustness tests that allow the effect of the post-boom shale
endowment to depend on the 2003–4 baseline environmental voting record
within a district. Figure A9 shows that the results do not vary if we change
the sorting rule for deciding whether units are on the shale or no-shale side.
In tables A10 and A11, we show that the results are strengthened if we
exclude the no-fracking New York State.
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pressure on environmental policy in the electoral districts
bordering the Marcellus Shale play. The negative effects are
substantial and stable across the models. Theoretically, shale
gas may create demand for environmental policy or pressure
to relax regulations if actors with an economic interest in
extraction prevail. Our empirical analyses provide support
for the latter argument. Some individuals might become more
concerned about the environmental damage from fracking, but
our results seem to suggest that these concerns are outweighed
by the anticipation of economic windfall from fracking.
MECHANISM: BEHAVIORAL OR SELECTION?
Why do we see such change in voting patterns? Does access
to natural resources directly inﬂuence the behavior of leg-
islators (behavioral mechanism)? Or does it inﬂuence the
voting pattern through the election of anti-environmental
legislators (selection mechanism)? We examine these ques-
tions by studying (i) the effects of shale resources on the
House of Representatives election outcome, (ii) the narrow
versus broad effects of shale on environmental voting, and
(iii) the legislative voting pattern in districts that remained
in the hands of congressional members of the same party.
The ﬁrst exercise directly tests the selection mechanism by
looking at whether the electoral fortunes of anti-environmental
legislators are indeed more favorable due to shale access. The
second exercise also attempts to shed light on the underlying
mechanism: if behavioral change by legislators drives the down-
ward trend on environmental votes, we would only expect to
see legislators adjusting their voting only in policy areas related
to shale gas extraction, as they respond to demand in the
electorate. By contrast, if effects are felt across a range of do-
mains including those unrelated to fracking, this would pro-
vide support for the selection mechanism. The third exercise
allows us to see if legislators in districts with new access to
natural resources change their voting behavior. To foreshadow
the results, the evidence strongly suggests that the key mech-
anism driving the changes in roll-call voting records is the se-
lection mechanism, or the electoral success of Republicans:
while there is limited evidence for behavioral changes of legis-
lators who remain in power across elections, the shale boom
brings into power Republicans with strong anti-environmental
ideologies, who then vote in an anti-environment direction
while in ofﬁce.
Shale gas and electoral fortunes
of the Republican party
If the observed effects of shale on the legislative voting pattern
are driven by the selection mechanism, candidates with anti-
environment preferences—that is, Republicans—should be-8.094.070 on October 01, 2019 12:18:13 PM
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same identiﬁcation strategy as above, we examine the elec-
toral outcomes of districts along the shale border before and
after the boom. To estimate the pre-shale electoral trend, pre-
boom periods include observations of party membership
prior to and immediately after 2004 congressional elections
(ﬁg. A3 shows changes in Republican and Democratic rep-
resentation by district between the pre-boom and post-boom
periods). The pre-boom periods include observations in 2003
and 2005. We exclude observations for 2004 because obser-
vations from both 2003 and 2004 are determined by the 2002
election, except for one district that held a special election in
2004 out of 55 districts in the sample. The post-boom periods
include observations in 2011.
The results presented in table 2 suggest that voters in the
shale-affected districts have indeed become more likely to
vote for Republican candidates (or less likely to vote for dem-
ocrats). As the negative coefﬁcient on Shale suggests, the shale
districts, if anything, were less likely to have Republican mem-
bers of Congress. Yet, after the awareness of commercial via-
bility of shale gas increased, those same districts have become
signiﬁcantly more likely to have Republican members than
nonshale districts, as indicated by the positive coefﬁcient on the
interaction term throughout the models. Speciﬁcally, based onThis content downloaded from 169.22
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms model 1, the shale districts are estimated to become around
26 percentage points more likely to have Republican mem-
bers in their House seats compared to the pre-boom period.
This effect is robust to the inclusion of district ﬁxed effects
and state-speciﬁc trends (see table A16 for logistic regressions
and table A17 for predicted probabilities). It should be noted
that these results are based on the cross-sectional variation in
districts on either side of the border: because we are modeling
the inter-temporal variation, our ﬁndings cannot be attributed
to the Republican landslide wins in 2010 or to state-speciﬁc
tendencies.
The results provide support for the selection mechanism:
access to fossil fuel resources beneﬁts anti-environmental
candidates. We consistently ﬁnd the positive effects of shale
on the electoral performance of Republicans. As Republicans
are less favorable toward environmental causes than Demo-
crats in the American context, these ﬁndings on the better
electoral performance by Republicans in the shale districts in
the post-shale revolution period may suggest that access to
fossil fuel resources induces voter preferences toward anti-
environmental candidates. Tables A18 and A19 examine the
effect of shale gas on the vote share of Republican candidates
at the county level; tables A20 and A21, as well as ﬁgure A10,
illustrate these dynamics in state elections.Table 1. Effect of Shale Resource Endowments on Pro-Environmental VotingPro-Environmental Vote (1) (2)8.094.0
and Co(3)70 on October 
nditions (http:/(4)01, 2019 12:18:
/www.journals.u(5)Shale .045 2.022 2.101**
(.104) (.056) (.050)Post-boom .051 .051 1.042*** .051 1.006***
(.041) (.041) (.195) (.041) (.191)Rep. in 2004 2.502*** 2.531***
(.069) (.048)Shale # post-boom 2.149** 2.149** 2.202*** 2.149** 2.149**
(.066) (.066) (.071) (.066) (.066)Constant .383*** .738*** 258.494***
(.065) (.060) (51.818)Dist. FE No Yes Yes No No
State trends No No Yes No Yes
Adjusted R2 .008 .410 .434 .256 .366Note. Electoral districts are deﬁned as assigned to the shale side of the border if at least 20% of the surface
area is covered by shale play (viable resources). The model is linear and standard errors are clustered at the
district level. Data points are inversely weighted by the district’s predicted probability of falling on the
shale side of the border, calculated using probit regression of shale assignment on district size. Sample is
subsetted to votes that took place in the years 2003, 2004, 2010, and 2011 and to the districts along the
border of the shale play. N p 4,180.
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Narrow versus broad effects
If the selection mechanism drives the change in legislative
voting pattern, we would expect the negative effects of shale
gas on a wide range of environmental and energy issues. As
the shale boom turns voters toward Republican candidates
who are anti-environment in general, shale resources would
have an effect on environmental policy ambition unrelated
to fossil fuel extraction and use.
We test this expectation by analyzing whether the effects
of shale gas differ across the issue areas. By including a triple
interaction in table 3, we examine whether the effect appears
stronger for roll-call votes related to conventional energy
(fossil fuels, nuclear) and weaker for votes irrelevant to en-
ergy production. In the upper panel, we include an indicator
for votes on conventional energy, interacted with Shale and
Post-boom. The coefﬁcients on the triple interaction term are
all negative, suggesting that the negative effects of shale are
slightly stronger for votes on conventional energy issues.
However, the effects are not large (3.5 percentage points) and
the conﬁdence intervals around the coefﬁcients are wide. In
the lower panel, we add an indicator for roll-call votes un-
related to energy production, also interacted with Shale and
Post-boom. The triple interaction term for the difference for
irrelevant roll-call votes is positive and large (about 8.5 per-
centage points in all models), but again the conﬁdenceThis content downloaded from 169.22
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms intervals are wide. There is no clear evidence for the het-
erogeneous effect of shale resource endowments on envi-
ronmental voting by issue domains. Overall, these ﬁndings
suggest that the effect of access to shale gas resources on pro-
environmental voting is not systematically related to the type
of issue under consideration by the legislature: the ﬁndings
are thus consistent with the selection mechanism.
A direct test of the behavioral mechanism
To test the behavioral mechanism more directly, we next
explore the voting behavior of legislators in districts that
remained in the hands of the same party throughout the
period from 2003 to 2011. If the shale effects are driven by
the behavioral change of incumbent legislators, we should
observe a change in pro-environmental voting even from
these districts. In contrast, the selection mechanism does not
predict a change in pro-environmental voting in these dis-
tricts, because the change in voting behavior is mainly driven
by the electoral advantage of Republicans.
We reestimate the main models using observations lim-
ited to districts where the same party was in ofﬁce pre- and
post-boom periods. It is important to note that these es-
timates are conditional on a post-treatment outcome, spe-
ciﬁcally the party of the ofﬁce-holder, and we should there-
fore be careful interpreting them as causal. Nevertheless, if
the change in environmental voting is driven by behavioral
change, a large interaction effect should suggest evidence in
favor of the behavioral mechanism. Table 4 presents the
results. While signiﬁcant, the magnitude of the interaction
term is small compared to the main results. Thus, the evi-
dence for behavioral change is relatively weak: incumbents
who remain in ofﬁce after the shale gas boom respond to
downward pressure only marginally. We infer from these
results that the observed change in pro-environmental vot-
ing in the shale districts is mainly driven by the selection
mechanism.
CONCLUSION
Fossil fuels and other natural resources play an important
role in politics due to their economic value and potential
for environmental deterioration. Evaluating their effects
on politics, however, is difﬁcult because access to these re-
sources is not due to chance alone. We have used the rapid
change in access to shale gas resources through fracking in
the United States to conduct a quasi-experimental analysis of
how a large fossil fuel windfall shapes politics. Speciﬁcally,
we have investigated how the environmental votes have
changed between the years 2003–4 (pre-boom) and 2010–
11 (post-boom) around the Marcellus Shale formation. The
absence of electoral redistricting during this time in the studyTable 2. Effect of Shale Resource Endowments on Party
of Member of CongressRepublican in House Seat (1) (2) (3)Shale 2.140
(.130)Post-boom 2.088 2.088 2.201*
(.054) (.066) (.106)Shale # post-boom .255*** .255** .350***
(.096) (.117) (.128)Constant .735***
(.074)Dist. FE No Yes Yes
State trends No No Yes
Adjusted R2 .006 .764 .792Note. Pre-boom periods include observations of party membership in
2003 and 2005. Post-boom periods include only observations in 2011
following congressional elections of 2010. Model is ﬁtted using a linear
probability model, standard errors clustered at district level, and obser-
vations inversely weighted by predicted probability of receiving a shale
endowment conditional on district size. N p 165.
* p ! .1
** p ! .05.
*** p ! .01.8.094.070 on October 01, 2019 12:18:13 PM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Table 3. Heterogeneous Effect of Shale Resource Endowments on Pro-Environmental Voting by Issue TypePro-Environmental VoteThis content 
All use subject to University(1)downloaded from 169
 of Chicago Press Ter(2).228.094.070 on Octob
ms and Conditions (ht(3)er 01, 2019 12:18:13 
tp://www.journals.uch(4)PM
icago.edu/t-and-c).(5)Interaction with conventional energy:
Shale .048 2.019 2.097**(.103) (.051) (.049)
Post-boom .066* .066* 1.058*** .066* 1.022***(.040) (.040) (.194) (.040) (.190)
Conventional energy 2.011 2.011 2.015 2.011 2.014(.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018)
Rep. in 2004 2.502*** 2.531***(.069) (.048)
Shale # post-boom 2.143** 2.143** 2.196*** 2.143** 2.143**(.067) (.067) (.074) (.067) (.067)
Conv. energy # post-boom 2.079*** 2.079*** 2.075*** 2.079*** 2.075***(.022) (.022) (.022) (.022) (.022)
Conv. energy # shale 2.012 2.012 2.012 2.012 2.012(.042) (.043) (.043) (.042) (.042)
Conv. energy # shale # post-boom 2.035 2.035 2.035 2.035 2.035(.044) (.044) (.044) (.044) (.044)
Constant .386*** .741*** 259.082***(.062) (.059) (51.718)
Dist. FE No Yes Yes No No
State trends No No Yes No Yes
Adjusted R2 .014 .416 .440 .262 .372Interaction with Irrelevance Indicator:
Shale .045 2.022 2.101**(.106) (.058) (.051)
Post-boom .060 .060 .946*** .060 .910***(.041) (.042) (.190) (.041) (.187)
Irrelevant .203*** .203*** .158*** .203*** .160***(.056) (.056) (.057) (.056) (.057)
Rep. in 2004 2.502*** 2.531***(.069) (.048)
Shale # post-boom 2.155** 2.155** 2.208*** 2.155** 2.155**(.066) (.067) (.071) (.066) (.066)
Irrelevant # post-boom 2.133** 2.133** 2.145** 2.133** 2.144**(.066) (.067) (.067) (.067) (.066)
Irrelevant # shale .001 .001 .003 .001 .001(.083) (.084) (.084) (.083) (.083)
Irrelevant # shale # post-boom .085 .085 .086 .085 .085(.105) (.105) (.105) (.105) (.105)
Constant .370*** .725*** 229.954***(.066) (.061) (50.669)
Dist. FE No Yes Yes No No
State trends No No Yes No Yes
Adjusted R2 .015 .416 .437 .263 .369Note. The models from table 1 have an interaction term added, which indicates how the main shale effect varies by the type of roll-call vote. The upper panel
shows product terms for votes on conventional energy (fossil fuels, nuclear power). The lower panel shows votes product terms for topics unrelated to
energy production: wildlife, oceans, transportation. Same models and standard errors estimated as in table 1. N p 4,180.
* p ! .1.
** p ! .05.
*** p ! .01.
644 / Broad Impact of Narrow Conﬂict Jasper Cooper, Sung Eun Kim, and Johannes Urpelainenarea enables us to compare differing trends in environmental
voting across shale and nonshale electoral districts. We have
also provided theory and evidence in support of the conten-
tion that the change in voting is driven by the electoral per-
formance of Republicans in areas with access to shale gas.
These ﬁndings show how resource windfalls shape the
incentives, behavior, and electoral fortunes of elected ofﬁ-
cials. The local winners from shale gas extraction dominate
politics over shale gas. Shale gas thus creates a local resource
curse by encouraging elected ofﬁcials to relax environmen-
tal policies, which undermines the state’s ability to control
negative externalities. In polarized legislatures, in which leg-
islators vote in a highly “constrained” (Converse 1964) man-
ner, the very existence of fossil fuel resources may thus con-
tribute to the weakening of environmental governance, as
anti-environmental candidates dominate elections. In the
United States, the downward pressures generated by a nat-
ural resource windfall apply to environmental and energy
policies across the board. In a less polarized society with a
partisan consensus on environmental issues, such broad
downward effects could fail to materialize. In such contexts,
we might expect candidates to win ofﬁce by campaigning
on a pro-shale platform, without their necessarily being
constrained to vote in any particular way on the regulation
of other issues, such as oceans and wildlife. Within the
United States, polarization at the state, or even local, level
might condition the broad effects of narrow conﬂicts over
natural resource windfalls.This content downloaded from 169.22
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms We thus consider the empirical analysis of the political and
policy effects of windfalls in different social, cultural, and
institutional settings an important frontier for the study of
the political economy of natural resources and the environ-
ment. While there is now a large body of literature on the
resource curse, our ﬁndings show that even in a context char-
acterized by liberal democracy and electoral accountability,
natural resource windfalls can produce large changes in leaders’
environmental policy preferences, perhaps even leading to
the underprovision of regulations. While Goldberg, Wibbels,
andMvukiyehe (2008, 493) argue “that political incumbents in
resource-abundant polities with fair and free elections manage
to win by larger margins and preserve vote shares in the face
of adverse circumstances in a way that politicians without ac-
cess to mineral rents will not,” we show that the effect of nat-
ural resource windfalls can be more complicated than that, as
voters turn against incumbents with pro-environmental pref-
erences. Given the increased public salience of natural re-
sources, and fossil fuels in particular, at a time of rapid climate
change, the impact of natural resource windfalls on policies
and politics is an important frontier for research.
Our empirical strategy is also suited for examining other
outcomes, such as public opinion, provided that researchers
can conduct ﬁne-grained surveys at the district level. An-
other natural direction for future research concerns the ap-
plicability of our ﬁndings to other conﬂicts over natural re-
sources. In the case of the American shale revolution, the
economic stakes were high—especially in the aftermath ofTable 4. Effect of Shale Resource Endowment on Environmental Voting in Districts Where Representatives of
the Same Party Were Been in Ofﬁce from the Pre-Shale to the Post-Shale PeriodPro-Environmental Vote (1) (2)8.094.070 o
and Condit(3)n October 01, 2019 
ions (http://www.jou(4)12:18:13 PM
rnals.uchicago.edu/t-a(5)Shale .102 2.009 2.050
(.152) (.036) (.050)Post-boom .013 .013 .182 .013 .208
(.019) (.020) (.134) (.019) (.129)Republican 2.743*** 2.679***
(.050) (.064)Shale # post-boom 2.077* 2.077* 2.035 2.077* 2.077*
(.044) (.044) (.050) (.044) (.044)Constant .361*** .877*** 53.215
(.084) (.040) (34.277)Dist. FE No Yes Yes No No
State trends No No Yes No Yes
Adjusted R2 .005 .583 .586 .542 .553Note. Same models and standard errors estimated as in table 1. N p 2,584.
* p ! .1.
** p ! .05.
*** p ! .01.nd-c).
Volume 80 Number 2 April 2018 / 645the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis—and the uncertainties surround-
ing the environmental externalities considerable. Moreover,
some environmentalists preferred shale gas to coal for rea-
sons of climate mitigation. Thus, examining other cases, such
as mining or forestry, could prove interesting insights into the
generalizability of our results on the broad impacts of narrow
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